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Re: In the Matter of the Adoption o 
Case No. 870415-CA 
infant Anonymous; 
Dear Court of Appeals: 
A final Westlaw search on the issues involved in this appeal 
uncovered a case recently out of the Supreme Court of South 
Dakota in which the court held that it is inappropriate to 
determine contested factual issues in a ch i Id custody case on the 
basis of affidavits, Dixon v. Di xon, 423 N. W, 2d 507 (Apr:! 1 27, 
1988). 
"While the case is hot directly on point, it offers a well 
reasoned analysis of the need for testimony on contested issues 
in order to resolve important matters such as child custody. The 
case supports Point 11(b) of Appellants' Brief and Point III of 
Appellants' Reply Brief in which appellant argues that it was 
inappropriate for Jiidge Moffat to resolve questions of fact on 
the basis of the conf] icting affidavits submitted by the parties. 
Very truly yours, 
COIITJi,, RArFAPORT & SEGAL 
Julie A. Bryan 
JAB/td 
enclosure 
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Decided A .1 27, 1988: 
<smussen o f N e l s o n & H a r d i n g , R a p i r j an t a n d 
I'llLLtK , J US X ice . 
This is an appeal from a judgment amending decree of divorce wher 
trial court increased the amount of child support, required a wage 
from husband, entered civil judgment against husband as reimburses 
losses sustained in the sale of the property, den.ied a reduction : 
and awarded attorney fees. We affirm in part, and because of the 
utilization of affidavits on certain issues, ye reverse in part ar 
FACTS 
Because of the state of the record, it is necessary to segregate 
into two parts (1) undisputed factual background and (2) matters c 
There are no transcripts or depositions in the record. As will be 
later, the disputed facts were submitted to the trial court by wa\ 
and written argument of counsel. 
(1) Undisputed Factual Background—From our review of the record 
appellate briefs it appears that the following factual, scenario i: 
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Brenda Lee Dixon (wife), and Roger Dean Dixon (husband), were married on 
November 11, 1SG7. Two daughters, presently ages eleven and twelve, were born 
of this marriage. The parties were divorced on January 25, 1985. Husband was, 
and s t i l l t t e a d i l v e m p l o y e d - Mu now remarrier and a 1 legedlx 
contributes to the suppor us present wife's children, who 
\ i e p -. 
1 I H J I : 
o b l i g a t i o n s L; l the 
i not his own. 
r"'_*pi *i/.e;i l\.'«2 u- •. ._• u n s ^ 1 : r\ the di^'-rce, >in\^r^z i n I* c o 
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from February 1985 to February 198G; commencing March 1986 alimony was to be 
reduced to $250 per month, with the provision that when, and if, wife received 
employment and earned a salary over $700 per month, alimony would be reduced 
to $100 per month. 
The parties were granted joint legal custody of the minor children, with 
physical custody granted to wife subject to a schedule of visitation for 
husband set out in the agreement. Child support was set at $250 per month per 
child, with husband and wife each allowed to claim one of the children for 
purposes of income tax exemptions. Finally, husband was to deposit $10 per 
month into the children's savings accounts for their post-secondary education.-
During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired real property, 
consisting of the marital home and an adjoining mobile home park. This 
property was purchased for $95,000 in 1978, on a contract for deed. Under the 
decree, the title to the real property was transferred to a tenancy m common 
and pieced for sale. IFNll The relationship established in the ^iiouiaiion and 
in the divorce decree was that of the husband in the role of landlord and wife 
in the role of tenant- Husband was given sole responsibility for the payment 
of insurance, taxes, and the payments on the contract for deed. Additionaiiy, 
husband was to collect ail rental income from the mobile home park. 
Accordingly, husband was to assume complete managerial responsibility and to 
specifically be responsible for all maintenance and repairs to the residence 
and property. Until the real property was sold, wife and children were granted 
the exclusive possession and use of the marital home. Husband was also ordered 
to pay wife $5,500 plus ten percent interest (approximately $120.42 per month 
for seventy-two months). 
Subsequent to the divorce, problems developed. A hearing was held and later, 
on April 30, 1985, the court entered an order entitled ,!Terms and Conditions of 
Occupancy, Maintenance and Use of the Marital Home and Land.!i Basically, the 
order specified and clarified the terms provided in the stipulation and 
agreement, which had been incorporated in the divorce decree. (At this 
hearing, custody and visitation were also placed at issue and subsequently, on 
September 3, 1985, the parties stipulated to an Girder for mediation to resolve 
visitation conflicts. However, after two sessions, husband cancelled further 
appointments. ) 
On August 1, i98G, wife received notice of default on the contract for 
deed on the real property, with the payment of $1,250 past due since December 
20, 1985. The notice advised that unless payment was made within thirty days, 
the deed holder would foreclose, 
( 2 ) Ma11 ers at 1 s sue--0n Augus t 4-, 1986 , husband ( t hrough new c ounse 1 ) filed a 
motion for an order to show cause, requesting an amendment to the decree of 
divorce seeking the principal care, custody and control of the minor children, 
CQPFL (C) WEST 1988 NO CLAIM TO QRIG. U.S. GOUT. WORKS 
ft 
or in the alternative an adjustment of the custody and visitation schedule, and 
a reduction of the alimony payments. Husband also claimed that he should 
receive some cred i t f or t he " f ree ren 1 a I " en j oyed by w i f e for 1 i v my i n i he 
home pending the sale of the property. This motion was supported by a three-
page affidavit with two attachments itemizing certain of his income and 
expenses. The affidavit specifically requested that oral testimony be 
Wif e then P i 1 ed a m o i 
an a f fida vit in respor 
motion for contempt:: 
the order ;> w c a Li s e 
F o i l o w i n q t h is fill ng wc r I u r r a f f i d a v i t s b y b o t h 
parties making assertions and accusations against each other. 
As far as we can tell from the record, no hearing was held on the above 
specific motions. However, after a hearing held on September 15, 1986, the 
trial court did enter an interim order requiring husband to quitclaim his 
interest in the real estate to wife and further giving her absolute authority 
to sell the property. The court also ordered that it would later determine the 
amount husband owed wife "as a result of the loss on the sale of the 
property." (There is no transcript of this hearing. The trial court entered 
no memorandum decision nor findings and conclusions, Apparently the court 
assumed that the property would sell for less than the agreed price and that 
husband was at fault for such. Because of the state of the record, we are not 
privy to the argument of counsel nor the court's rationale on this interim 
order, ) 
After the trial court entered the interim order, wife filed a motion for 
increase m child support and alimony. Once again, the flurry of affidavits 
continued with both parties making additional accusations and assertions 
against each other. Attached to some of the affidavits were various documents, 
which the parties felt supported their claims. 
The record also contains correspondence of counsel to the court, usually in 
the form of argument on the merits. EFN21 
On January 21, 1987, the trial court filed a memorandum decision in 
which it specifically stated that "the matter has been submitted on affidavits 
and by way of argument through correspondence with the court. 1 do not need 
additional testimony to decide the issues now before the court." The court, 
which later adopted findings of fact and conclusions of law implementing 
specific portions of its memorandum decision, 
( 1 ) denied busbanc eduction of alimony 
(2) continued the custody and visitation as previously ordered, 
(3) determined that the sale of the real estate was less than what it was 
worth because of the conduct and "obstreperous behavior" of husband and that he 
frustrated the sale of the property, 
(4) determined that because husband was responsible for the shortfall 
referred to in (3) wife's equity should have been $12,668, but that she only 
received $6,333, 
(5) because of (3) and (4), ordered a civil judgment against husband for 
(6) increased child support payments by $59 per month pursuant to the 
statutory guidelines (SDCL 25-7-7), and 
(7) granted a wage assignment in the amount of child support and alimony, and 
(8) awarded attorney fees of $1500. 
On appeal, husband argues (by way of his third lawyer), among other things, 
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that the court received insufficient evidence with regard to the property, the 
cause of any disrepair, the real estate market and its effect upon the sale 
price, and received no testimony with regard to this except that contained in 
coneluslonary affidavits of the parties. The other issues were also decided 
only upon consideration of various affidavits with attachments filed by the 
parties, the correspondence of counsel with various attachments, and argument 
DECISION 
USE OF fiFFIDnUITS 
The trial court was confronted with a complex set of greatly disputed facts. 
Its experience with the parties, the property, the litigation, and the 
procedural history of the case, may very well have aided it to the extent that 
it did "not need additional testimony." However, 6\j.e to the absence of any 
transcripts and the state of the record, we do not have that luxury. Perhaps 
additional testimony was not needed for its purposes, but it surely is for 
ours. Wife argues that husband consented to the•procedure by not insisting on 
oral testimony and by participating in the method of the proceedings. However, 
that argument does not respond to our need to have the ab11ity to make a 
meaningful review on appeal. 
we begin with the basic premise that "Ca 3ffidavits are unsatisfactory as forms 
of evidence; they are not subject to cross-examination, combine facts and 
conclusions and, unintentionally or sometimes even intentionally, may omit 
important facts or give a distorted picture of them." Brewster v. F.C. Eussf 
Co., 78 S.D. 129, 132, 8d N . W . ^ G 4/, 44 .^itJbti/; /fi u.j.b. nrriaavits ss bb~b: 
ni ev] 
 R i >« = ^  1 
2d 2 (1959); 2A C J S Aff d
although made under oath, are ordinarily not considered 
Saturnini v. Saturnim, 260 Minn. 494, 110 N. W. 2d 480 
Whitman, 28 Wis.2d 50, lob N.W.Zc (iyb5 ). 
•H ^R: ) • wn J tn 
15-6-43* •J-.=,4- " r,,. ii-Lwlhen a motion is based on facts not appearing 
of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the 
respective oarties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or 
partly on oral testimony or depositions." (Emphasis added.) Thus, admitting 
depositions or oral testimony, in addition to affidavits, rests within the 
trial court's discretion. SDCL 15~H-43(e); 58 rim.Jur.2d Motions, Rules, and 
Order ss 22~25 (1971); 60 C.J.S. Motions & Orders s 37(5) (1969); Saturnini, 
supra. 
Every party, as a matter of right, is not entitled to oral testimony on 
every motion or on every issue of fact. Obviously, there are many cases where 
no oral, testimony need be received and the trial court, in the exercise of 
sound discretion, may permit the trial of an issue of fact, involved m the 
motion, on non-oral testimony. Saturnini, supra. However, the trial court m 
exercising this discretion must be cautious to prevent a circumvention of 
justice. 
CHILD CUSTODY 
[ i J 
11] Generally, a child custody determination, or the modification thereof, is 
too vital to be determined on the basis of affidavits. These issues are best 
decided on competent evidence which has been subjected to cross-examination. 
Millea v. Millea, 89 S.D. 112, 229 N.W.2d 95 (1975). In Whitman, supra, the 
propriety of using affidavit 
determining child custody. That court stated: 
0^ CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOUT, WORKS 
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While we do not say that an affidavit filed subsequent to a hearing in a 
custody matter cannot be considered under any circumstances, we do disapprove 
.1 f = rt.^ 5n t ed i n tni: 
The quotation that follows goes beyond a fair criticism of the record m thi 
contrasted to 
i n i 
case, but illustrates the importance of sworn testimony as 
affidavits in child custody cases'-
T he p1 ain i if f f urther con tends tha t the trial c our t, in de t erm i; 
c o n t r c v e r s y , p r o c e e d e d i n a n u n w a r r anted ma n n e r , in that no h e a r i n Q 3 u c r i a s 
ouqht 4o have been had in so important a matter was in fact had, T'-e whole 
hearing was conducted quite informally and without an opportunity to make a 
record or without a record in fact being made. We think the procedure adopted 
by the court in this important matter is justly subject to criticism. 
Judgments in divorce cases should not be so modified as to the custody of a 
child or children, In such a. case, where a contest exists, and especially 
where a hearing is demanded, a hearing should be given. The witnesses should 
be sworn and an opportunity given to cross-examine them. The testimony should 
be taken by the reporter so that a record may be made in case either of the 
parties desires to appeal and hav& such order reviewed. We have not before us 
in this appeal any record of what was said by the attorneys, what informal 
conversations were had between the court and the witnesses, what testimony, if 
any, was given, and what in fact the court acted upon. In a matter of such 
vital concern to the parties and to the child whose interests are, of paramount 
importance, a record should be made to the end that a party may not be denied 
an effective appeal.' Smith v. Smith (1932), 209 Wis. 605, 610-11, 245 IM. W. 
Whitman, 28 Wis,2d at 60-61, 135 N.W,2d at 840. 
;ourt in baxurnini, supra, staiea: 
Due process requires that the hearing be fair, practicable, and reasonable, 
Where change of custody of minor children, is involved it is usually incumbent 
upon the court to determine the fitness or lack of fitness of a parent. In 
contested cases it is difficult to see how such a determination could properly 
be made by relying solely upon affidavits. Modification of support payments, 
on the other hand, generally requires only a showing of change in either need 
on the one side or ability to pay on the other. In most situations xhese 
determinations cars fairlv be made without taking oral testimony* Where the 
T ,=* Q T c p: complicated or the affidavits so conflicting as to render 
-Qss-
1
 o c e d u r • e must examination essential, then the desirability of expeditioi 
way to a more formal hearing, 
Saturn ini, 260 Minn, at 498, 110 N.W.2d at 4 8 3 , We agree with the Wisconsin 
and Minnesota courts, and conclude that the use of affidavits alone in 
determining a request for custody modification is inappropriate, absent a cit 
showing on the record that oral, testimony is not necessary 
serious nature of the allegations and 
considering xne 
jarties have made 
against each o 
the trial cour 
on af fiday its, 
presented to t 
;ou n1e d with the - ht* 5sues i n v o i v e i 
s n ! * ! • bused its discretion in m a k m g its determination based 
herefore, on remand, the custody issues are to be properly 
trial court. 
PROPERTY DIUISION 
[ 2 J 
[ 2 ] N. o t a. i 1 i s s u e s o f 
Hou w n e n . 
-ope r 
rnp 
division reqi. ve an evioeniiar near i n Q 
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with generally complicated claims, affidavits are not sufficient, See 
nenerallv Saturnini, suora; Dillon, supra; 2 A C.J.S. Affidavits 55 5G~-5o 
As in the child custody modification issue, the parties made serious 
•nnfHctinn allegations and cross-allegations bv affidavit. These affidavits, 
jounseis' correspondence, and the numerous attached exhibits have not been 
ne r scrutiny properly afforded through the 
many, m ).na, we i.id not need 
fiddvit 
:urther 
property issue. However, in view of the unique circumstances here, we must 
give additional guidance and direction to the trial court. 
[33 
C3] As stated earlier, the parties agreed to, and the trial court approved in 
its decree of divorce, an arrangement whereby the net proceeds of the sale of 
the property were to be divided equally, The trial court later, in essence, 
amended that decree when it entered its order regarding the "Terms and 
C ond111ons of 0 cc upa nc y , M a i nt en a n c e a nd Us e of t h e M a r11 a 1 Home and L a nd." 
[FN31 11 f u r t h e r a pp e a r s t o h ave m edified t he d e cr e e i n the i nt e r im order by 
requiring husband to quitclaim his interest to wife and giving her absolute 
authority to sell the property. Then, in its last order, the trial court 
further amended the decree by determining the amount of husband's equity to be 
something less than half of the net proceeds and awarded a civil judgment 
apainst husband for the difference* 
f the nature and condition of the recc , we are unaoie to ascertain 
he t her the trial court had .jurisdiction to enter such an order. It is settled 
aw, as stated in Blare v, Blare, 302 N.W.2d 787, 790 (5.0=1981), that: 
in the absence of fraud or other reasons that would apply to any 
udgment, a divorce decree that divides or allots property or provides for 
. leu mar- is a final and c o n c l u s i v e a d j u d i c a t i o n 
b /i, i / b N . W . / Q 
v a 11 u i" p tj ?! v . v ci * i u i e p e J!, {o D . L J IM.W.^d 4Ht 
; m a n d. the t ? : o u r x must f i •- iscertain, under the guidelines o 
Blare, whether it had jurisdiction to enter its order and, if so, to articulate 
its findings and conclusions regarding such jurisdiction. Otherwise, wife must 
pursue her remedies through other more appropriate civil measures* 
CHILD SUPPORT, ALIMONY, AND ATTORNEY FEES 
Sat u 
involve a showing of change in need or ability to na\ 
affidavit. See also SDCL 15-S-43(e>« For the s< 
jeriy be heard by 
ime reasons, issues dealino 
wi i imony and attorney fees may be determined in such manner, 
McAIister v, McAIister, 14 N.C.App. 159, 187 S.E.2d 449 (1972); Miller 
Miller, 270 N.C. 140, 153 S.E.2H 854 (1967)= 
and oraer o Her^ e, the non-oral testimony supports the findings, concL 
the trial court regarding these issues. We do not find them to be clearly 
erroneous or an abuse of discretion, Wilson v. Wilson, 399 N,W„2d 890 
(S.D.1987); Moore v. Moore, 354 N.W.2d 732 (S.0.1984), 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, 
MORGAN and SABERS, JJ., concur. 
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HENDERSON, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in p a r t ) . 
I agree with that aspect of the majority decision which reverses in part and 
remands in part the lower court's decision. I concur that the child custody 
and property division be reversed and remanded for oral testimony, deeper 
reflection, and more extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
However, I cannot agree that the child support should be affirmed for the 
reason that this Court has reversed the child custody determination. 
Therefore, when new and/or different testimony is taken below, as distinguished 
from trial by a f f i d a v i t , a totally new/different determination, hypothetically, 
could be made by the trial judge. In appellant's brief, he exhorts the issue 
of child custody be remanded "to the trial court for the receipt of evidence 
and testimony with regard to this issue and the best interests of the 
children. '" It is illogical to affirm a money award of child support because 
the essence of the majority opinion is to return this case for a proper 
evidentiary hearing. 
When oral testimony is heard, it is possible that the father is awarded 
custody of the children. H e n c e , we cannot bind the trial court to child 
support in a certain amount of dollars to be awarded unto mother by father. 
We are saying in one breath to the trial judge, open the door and your 
mind by oral testimony on the child support issue, and yet we are affirming the 
lower court on award of money for child support unto the mother. 
As I understand the decision, the property division is not being affirmed; if 
it is not being affirmed, it is being reversed, for, indeed, there is a remand 
for a redetermination. The majority opinion characterizes this as "additional 
guidance and direction to the trial c o u r t . " It is obvious that the trial 
court, from the recitation as depicted in the majority opinion, did not follow 
the precedent of Blare v. Blare, 302 N.W.Zd 787 ( S . 0 , 1 9 8 1 ) . Once we vault the 
mental hurdle that the n r o p e r t' v i: has beer 
redecided below turn our minds xo Krage 
leversed and is 10 
;>e, 32 9 N.W.Zd 878 
(S,0.1983). Property division and alimony are to be considered together. 
Alimony should not be isolated nor should the property division be isolated, 
It is well established precedent in this Court that the two are to be 
considered together. Reasons behind this rule are well grounded in that a 
property award could be so great that alimony was not justified; or that an 
alimony award should be justified because the property division for a party is 
meager. Therefore, I disagree heartily with the majority opinion on affirming 
alimony and would therefore reverse and remand that issue to be determined in 
light of the developments on the property division issue. If not considered 
together, alimony in this case becomes an island unto itself, broken away fro\f\ 
the equitable package—fioating without judicial firmament. 
COPR. (C) WEST 1988 NO CLAIM TO GRIG. U.S. GOUT, WORKS 
a 
3 
3 
FN1. It was not to be sold for less than $85,000 unless 
b y 1; h e par" t i e s . if n o t 5 o 1 d u y J a n u a ry 2 b , 1 9 o b , t n e p r ] 
reduced by $2,500; if not sold by January 25, 1387, the 
reduced to $90,000 cash. 
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counsel. 
FN3. This "amendment" or clarification may have been proper as the 
original decree of divorce provided: "The parties will execute a separate 
agreement relating to the handling of matters affecting the real property 
until such time as it is sold, setting forth their respective rights and 
responsibilities.... If the parties cannot agree on the terms and 
conditions of this agreement, the matter shall be submitted to the court." 
S.D.,1988. 
Dixon v. Dixon 
(To be reported at 
END OF DOCUMENT 
423 N.W.2d 507) 
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